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Non-Technical Summary
We show that, since the inception of energy futures markets, prices have on average
exhibited backwardation. Normal backwardation has also been the norm, but,
because of the low power of the standard tests, most researchers have concluded that
the unbiased expectations model cannot be rejected. The fact that backwardation has
been and (though somewhat more weakly) continues to be prevalent makes
MGRM’s strategy of hedging long-term supply commitments with short-dated
futures contracts look somewhat better than previous observers have argued. That
said, it should be re-stressed that their strategy was a highly speculative one and its
unraveling should have come as no great surprise.
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Abstract
We show that, since the inception of energy futures markets, prices have on average
exhibited backwardation. Normal backwardation has also been the norm, but,
because of the low power of the standard tests, most researchers have concluded that
the unbiased expectations model cannot be rejected. The fact that backwardation has
been and (though somewhat more weakly) continues to be prevalent makes
MGRM’s strategy of hedging long-term supply commitments with short-dated
futures contracts look somewhat better than previous observers have argued. That
said, it should be re-stressed that their strategy was a highly speculative one and its
unraveling should have come as no great surprise.
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21 Introduction
Headline debacles in derivatives markets during the last decade have attracted the
attention of many observers. One of the most egregious was the billion dollar plus
loss incurred by the German company Metallgesellschaft in the early 1990s. This
arose as a result of a series of long-term contracts that its U.S. subsidiary,
Metallgesellschaft Refining and Marketing (MGRM), negotiated to sell energy
products, which was hedged with a program based on short-dated derivatives, and
the subsequent liquidation of these positions by the parent company. The wisdom of
these actions has been extensively debated (Culp and Miller (1995), Edwards and
Canter (1995a, 1995b), Mello and Parsons (1995) and Pirrong (1997)).
Most contentious is the debate over the soundness of, first, the original contractual
program; second, the manner in which it was hedged; and third, the rapid unwinding
of all positions. Culp and Miller (1995) are the main defenders, believing that the
parent company should have weathered the storm, and were unwise to terminate the
hedging program because of short-term liquidity problems. Pirrong (1997) has
shown that MGRM’s barrel-for-barrel short-dated hedging program implied
significant overhedging. While protection was afforded from parallel shifts in the
term structure of futures prices, significant exposure still existed to shifts in the
slope of the term structure. In fact, this researcher shows that a hedge ratio of less
than 50% would have been optimal, and that it would have been less risky to remain
unhedged than hedge barrel-for-barrel. Neuberger (1999) has recently modeled the
problem of an agent hedging a long-term supply commitment with short-dated
futures. He suggests that medium-term maturity contracts would likely prove best.
Perhaps MGRM, despite claims to the contrary, was speculating rather than hedging
(Mello and Parsons 1995). Their hedging program was heavily influenced by a
belief that energy markets are typically in backwardation, that is, spot prices exceed
futures prices (and short-dated futures exceed longer-dated futures). Backwardation
will certainly occur at times for seasonal commodities because of a convenience
yield which arises when a commodity is in short supply. Still, their overhedging
seems to have been predicated on the view that backwardation would on average
hold over long periods of time.
There is a related but somewhat different concept, namely normal backwardation,
which exists when future expected spot prices exceed futures prices.1 The extant
empirical evidence (Kolb (1992) and Deaves and Krinsky (1995)) indicates that
energy futures markets have historically been subject to neither normal
backwardation nor normal contango. That is to say, futures prices are unbiased
predictors of future spot prices, implying a pure expectations model is appropriate.
                                          
1 Though usage is not consistent here, I will use contango to signify the opposite of
backwardation, and normal contango the opposite of normal backwardation.
3The problem with this finding is that, as we discuss below, persistent backwardation
usually requires the existence of normal backwardation. Therefore, if normal
backwardation does not hold, MGRM’s speculative hedging program seems to have
been on shaky ground.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. Our first intention is to revisit the MGRM
debate. While we do not intend to delve into many of the issues ably dealt with by
previous commentators, our contribution is to clarify the implication for energy
price processes of MGRM’s view that energy markets are typically in
backwardation, using both data that management had at its disposal at the time of
the hedge program, as well as data that have subsequently become available. Our
second intention is to provide the latest evidence on the potential existence of
normal backwardation in energy futures markets. To preview, we conclude that the
preponderance of the evidence indicates that backwardation – both in the period up
to the MGRM crisis, as well during the recent past – was present often enough and in
sufficient degree to lead MGRM to believe that their strategy might have been a
judicious one. On the other hand, we find that a pure expectations model of energy
futures prices cannot be rejected (that is, neither normal backwardation nor normal
contango holds). We suggest a simple explanation as to why it is possible to reject
normal backwardation while at the same time concluding backwardation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the contractual position
of MGRM and how they chose to hedge it. At the same time we address the
relationship between backwardation and normal backwardation, and the role played
by seasonality. In the next section, we examine the behavior of energy futures prices
both prior to and subsequent to the liquidation of MGRM’s positions, in order to see
what the data tell us about the potential existence of backwardation and normal
backwardation. In Section 4, we interpret our findings. The final section concludes.
2 The strategy of hedging long-term contracts by rolling over
short-dated futures, and its relationship to backwardation
and normal backwardation
2.1 The essential nature of MGRM’s contracts
Consider a distributor which has locked itself into a long-term delivery contract but
which only acquires the commodity shortly before it must make delivery. The profit
(per unit) based on a contract to sell a commodity T periods in the future, hedged by
4initially going long in a matching number of nearby (single-period) futures contracts
that are subsequently rolled over each time a contract reaches delivery, is: 2
0 1 1[ (0) (1)]
T
TtT t tf fc s      (1)
where T  is the distributor’s profit as of time-T; c0 is the long-term contract price
negotiated at time-0; st is the spot price at t; and ft(i) is the futures price at t for
delivery i periods ahead. This expression says that the firm’s profit is the long-term
contract price less the final spot price plus the sum of all profits made on the futures
contracts, that is, the cumulative futures returns. We ignore daily marking-to-market
and the compounding of intervening cash flows for simplicity. If energy futures are
subject to normal backwardation, the terms in the summation are on average
positive. Thus the greater is the extent of normal backwardation, the greater is the
likely profit. On the other hand, normal contango tends to reduce profitability.
The above expression can also be written as:
1
0 1 0[ (0) (1)] (1)
T
tT t tf f fc


    (2)
where we have used the fact that the basis converges to zero. This expression says
that the firm’s profit equals the long-term contract price less the initial short futures
price plus the sum of all profits made on the futures contract rollovers, that is the
cumulative futures rollovers. If crude oil futures are subject to backwardation, the
terms in the summation are on average positive, leading to an increase in the
profitability of the strategy. On the other hand, if contango is the norm, rollovers
would be negative thus reducing the profitability of the strategy.
2.2 Backwardation vs. normal backwardation
It is straightforward to decompose a rollover as follows:
1(0) (1) (1)tt tt t tf f ps sE     (3)
where pt (1) is the risk premium attached to a nearby futures contract. A negative
premium indicates normal backwardation, while a positive premium indicates
normal contango.
                                          
2 A rollover is the simultaneous sale of the expiring and purchase of the one-month contracts.
While this is a gross simplification of the nature of MGRM’s delivery obligations and the
manner in which they were hedged, the essential idea of hedging a long-term obligation by
rolling over short-dated futures is stressed.
5To clarify the relationship between backwardation and normal backwardation, it is
helpful to use equation (3) and consult Figure 1. Referring to the latter where the
axes constitute a decomposition of the (negative of the) right hand side of (3), note
that the anticipated price change is the y-axis and the risk premium is the x-axis.
Normal backwardation corresponds to quadrants B and C. The line with a slope of
negative unity intersecting the origin equally divides quadrants B and D. All points
below this line are consistent with backwardation. Much of the time (areas C and
B2) backwardation and normal backwardation go hand in hand.
Of greater interest though are areas wherein one condition holds without the other.
Area D1 corresponds to backwardation without normal backwardation, while area
B1 represents normal backwardation without backwardation. Of the two, B1 is a
much more likely long-term scenario. Over the long term (both consumer and
commodity) prices tend to rise. The implication is that under normal circumstances,
especially over the long term, it is fair to say that backwardation requires normal
backwardation.
The problem is that, as noted earlier, evidence exists that for most commodity
futures most of the time futures prices are extremely close to expected future spot
prices. That is, we have a world of pure expectations, not normal backwardation or
normal contango (Kolb (1992) and Deaves and Krinsky (1995)). This finding is
consistent with the idea that the risk inherent in futures positions is essentially
diversifiable and thus should not be rewarded.3
Consider the case of pure expectations. If futures prices are unbiased predictors of
future spot prices, we can rewrite each rollover as:
1(0) (1) tt tt tf f s sE    (4)
Here the rollover gain is the negative of the expected change in the spot price over
the relevant period. If we are in a normal inflationary environment where prices
usually creep up, rollovers would be expected to be negative and hence detract from
profitability. In fact in a competitive market, one would expect delivery contract
prices to be set at levels which, given current futures prices, would exactly offset
expected losses (because of price increases) on rollovers. That is to say, contracts
such as MGRM’s should be normal-profit arrangements, and the sort of over-
hedging that the company utilized was questionable.4
                                          
3 See Dusak (1973), Bodie and Rosansky (1980), Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983) and Baxter,
Conine and Tamarkin (1985).
4 In large part it was injudicious because of uncertainty about the future slope of the term
structure of futures prices. As was previously stated, MGRM’s hedging strategy protected it
from parallel shifts in the term structure of price expectations but not against changes in the
62.3 Seasonality
Before moving to the empirics, an additional issue pertaining to backwardation and
rollovers, namely seasonality, needs to be addressed. It is because of seasonality that
backwardation will sometimes be expected even if there is a zero risk premium and
the general price level is expected to rise. To see this, for simplicity suppose we are
in a (two-season) environment where the commodity is in short supply during the
year’s first season (w) and is in plentiful supply during the second season (s). Perfect
foresight is sufficient to bring out the essentials. We characterize the situation as:
(5)
where st,x is the spot price at time t and season x; k1 is the (percentage) trend in the
price of the commodity abstracting from seasonality; and k2 is the percentage by
which the real price at w is above the real price at s.5
Given a zero risk premium, the s-rollover is -k1 - k2 while the w-rollover is -k1 + k2.
Provided k2 > k1 the w-rollover is positive (i.e., backwardation). Such a condition
should not be surprising given the seasonal spikes that are observed in energy
futures markets. Nevertheless it should be stressed that the average rollover during
year t is -k1.
Thus, while backwardation may be expected some of the time, seasonality has no
impact on average rollovers over multi-year time spans (as corresponds to the case
of MGRM). Moreover it now becomes quite clear that average rollovers are
dominated by price level expectations. Over a long sample trends in the price of a
commodity will likely not be too far from trends in the general price level. This
implies the higher is the average inflation rate, the lower (i.e., the more negative)
will be the average typical rollover (and the less likely we are to see backwardation).
3 Evidence on backwardation and normal backwardation
3.1 Results on backwardation
With a dataset consisting of daily closing energy futures price data for the period
from January 1984 (January 1985 for gasoline) to December 2000, we begin by
                                                
slope. Stated differently, protection existed for once-and-for-all shifts in commodity prices but
not for changes in expected trends.
5 Of course ‘s’ stands for summer and ‘w’ for winter, and we have assumed – with no impact on
the demonstration -- summer is the second season in the year.
1 2 1,ln lntw t ss k k s   
1 2 ,ln lnts t ws k k s  
7generating gains/losses from rolling over futures contracts.6 Recall that a rollover is
calculated under the assumption that a trader, who is long the nearby futures
contract, reverses his position on the last trading day of the contract while
simultaneously purchasing a second-to-nearby (one-month) contract.7 The rollover
gain or loss (in dollar terms) from this strategy is the difference between the futures
price of the expiring contract on its last trading day (which should be very close to
the spot price) and the futures price of the one-month contract. That is,
Dollar Rollover Gain/Loss ( ) (0) (1),t t tRollt f f   (6)
where t is the last trading day of the old contract. In percentage terms, gains and
losses are defined as:
Percentage Rollover Gain/Loss ln ln( ) (0) (1).t t trollt f f   (7)
If backwardation is the norm in these contracts, then gains should occur more often
than losses, and on average rollovers should be profitable.
We calculate in Table 1 rollover gains/losses during 1984-2000 (or 1985-2000 for
gas), as well as during two roughly equal subperiods. The first is from 1984 to 1992
(or 1985-92 for gas). It is chosen because it runs from close to futures contract
inception to just before MGRM implemented its hedging strategy, and so it should
provide us with some insight into the futures price pattern that the company
observed. The second period is from 1993 to 2000. This period is examined in order
to ascertain whether the price pattern observed in the first period continued to hold.
Beginning with crude oil in Panel A, for all three periods, the overall averages, in
dollar terms, are positive and significant at the 5% level. In percentage terms, the
overall averages are significant in the first period and for the full sample, but only
marginally so in the second subperiod. This appears to suggest that backwardation
existed in the crude oil futures market in these periods. Two other points are salient.
First, in all periods, rollover gains occurred only slightly above 50% of the time.
Second, the averages of all rollover gains were much higher than the averages of all
rollover losses, which explains why the overall averages are significantly positive
even if occurrences of backwardation were only slightly more numerous than
occurrences of contango.
                                          
6 Gasoline contracts began trading in January 1985. The data were obtained from the Futures
Industry Association.
7 Edwards and Canter (1995) use a rollover rule that is slightly different. Specifically, they use
what they term the “three-day rollover rule,” where the sale of the old contract and the purchase
of the new contract occur three trading days prior to the last trading day of the old contract.
8In Panels B and C we report rollover gains/losses for the heating oil and unleaded
gasoline futures contracts respectively. As was the case with crude oil futures, both
the overall and subperiod averages in these panels are positive and significant (or
marginally so) in all three periods. Again, this means that average gains could be
obtained from rolling over energy contracts. Nevertheless the rather low frequency
of rollover gains (especially for heating oil) suggests that backwardation was far
from bankable. Clearly, once again, average positive gains were due to the fact that
rollover gains were generally of a higher magnitude than that of rollover losses.
One noteworthy result is that average rollovers for all three commodities, in both
dollar and percentage terms, are lower in the second period than in the first period.
Moreover, the frequency of rollover gains was also lower in the second period. This
implies that rolling over energy contracts may not have been as profitable in the
second period as in the first. Performing Chow tests for the differences in averages
between the two periods, we note, however, that the null hypothesis of no
differences cannot be rejected in any of the three cases.
With Table 2 we investigate seasonality. As mentioned earlier, it is well known that
gas prices tend to be higher in the summer because of the greater demand induced by
summer driving, while heating oil prices tend to be higher in the winter as the
weather necessitates greater usage for home heating purposes. The table provides the
frequency of rollover gains by month for our three energy commodities. As we
expect, heating oil rollovers tend to positive in the winter and negative in the late
summer and fall, while the opposite relationship emerges for gasoline.8 Given crack
arbitrage relationships (Girma and Paulson 1998), not surprisingly there is no strong
seasonality for crude oil.
To formally test for seasonality in rollovers, we run the following regression for all
three commodities in all three periods:
,
12
2
t
i
it Scroll 

(8)
where rollt is, as defined earlier, the percentage gain/loss from a rollover at time t, c
is a constant and Si, i = 2 to 12, are dummy variables for the months of February to
December. Si takes on the value of 1 if rollt comes from month i and zero otherwise.9
The null hypothesis is that futures prices do not exhibit seasonal patterns, in which
case the coefficients of Si, i = 2 to 12, should be jointly equal to zero. Panel A of
                                          
8 It is noteworthy that these seasonal patterns were much weaker in the second period than in the
first.
9 For example, if the last trading day of the old contract (i.e., the rollover day) falls in the month
of February, S2 is equal to 1 while S3 to S12 are equal to zero.
9Table 3 reports the p-values from chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis of no
seasonality for all three commodities in all three periods. As expected, the evidence
strongly supports seasonality for heating oil and unleaded gasoline, while it fails to
reject no seasonality for crude oil.
For the former two commodities then, proper estimation should account for a
seasonal effect. There is an additional effect that needs potentially to be accounted
for. Any calculations of means and t-statistics previously done are based on the
assumption of constant variance. It is now well recognized that this is invalid in the
presence of the volatility clustering that has been observed for energy futures
(Deaves and Krinsky 1992, 1995). Panel B of Table 3 reports p-values for Lagrange
multiplier ARCH(1) tests against the null hypothesis that lagged squared residuals
have no power to explain current squared residuals (i.e., there is no first-order
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity).10 The null hypothesis is rejected in
three cases – crude oil in the second period and in the combined period, and gasoline
in the first period.11 For these three cases, we re-estimate the mean rollovers (with
seasonality where appropriate) using ARCH(1) processes.12
The results are presented in Table 4. Of particular note is that the mean rollover goes
from being marginally positive to significantly positive (at the 5% level) in the case
of crude oil during the second subperiod. Though not shown in this table since the
point estimates are unchanged, for cases where seasonality is a factor but
homoscedasticity cannot be rejected, the mean rollover also goes from being
marginally positive to significantly positive in the case of heating oil during the
second subperiod.13
To summarize, our results show that for all three commodities in all three periods,
backwardation, as measured by the frequency of rollover gains, was not a frequent
occurrence. Nevertheless, because rollover gains were generally of a higher
magnitude than that of rollover losses, rolling over these three energy contracts was,
on average, a profitable strategy, especially in the period prior to 1993. This
conclusion is robust to consideration of seasonality and autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity.
                                          
10 Where seasonality was previously concluded, these ARCH tests are based on equation (8).
11 ARCH tests with lags up to six also failed to reject homoscedasticity for cases other than these
three.
12 ARCH(1) successfully accounted for the error structure since further ARCH testing was not
able to reject homoscedasticity. The exception was crude oil in the second period, where the
test could not reject ARCH in the residuals at lag six.
13 When we perform a regression (as in (8)) of rollovers on a constant and the seasonal dummies,
the overall average rollover is equal to the intercept plus the sum of the 11 dummies divided by
12.
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3.2 Normal backwardation
To test for normal backwardation, we calculate returns from holding one-month
futures contracts. That is, each month, a one-month futures contract is purchased and
then held until maturity. The return (in dollar terms) from this strategy is:
1Dollar Return ( ) (0) (1),t t tRETt f f    (9)
whereas the return in percentage form is:
1Percentage Return ( ) (0) ln (1).lnt t tt ret f f    (10)
If normal backwardation is the norm in energy futures markets, then returns in either
form should be positive more often than negative.
Our treatment of normal backwardation follows closely what was done for rollovers
so it will be kept brief. Similar to our tests in the previous subsection, we calculate
returns over the first, second and combined periods. Tables 5-8 for the most part
correspond to Tables 1-4. In Table 5, we see that, in all three periods, the average
percentage returns from the three commodities were positive but not significantly
different from zero (except marginally so in one case), while the frequency of
positive returns was close to 50%.14 These results do not indicate that normal
backwardation was typical in energy markets.
The frequencies of positive returns by month are reported in Table 6. Unlike the case
of rollovers in the previous subsection, there does not appear to be any seasonal
pattern in the frequencies of positive returns of any commodity. This is corroborated
by the p-values from chi-squared tests on the null hypothesis of no seasonality in
returns as reported in the upper panel of Table 7. In the lower panel of Table 7 we
investigate the possibility that the volatility of returns changes through time and is
serially correlated. The results of ARCH(1) tests suggest volatility clustering in four
cases – crude oil in the first and combined periods, and heating oil in the first and
combined periods.
For these four cases, we re-estimate mean returns using ARCH(1) processes. The re-
estimated results are reported in Table 8. Mean returns remain positive but
insignificantly so in all cases. Nevertheless, somewhat suggestively, crude oil for the
first subperiod and the full sample becomes marginally significant.15
                                          
14 Returns are positive at marginal significance for heating oil during the full sample.
15 We investigate (in the same manner as before) whether first-order ARCH is sufficient to
capture the form of the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, and we conclude that this
11
 In summary, our results show that for all three commodities in all three periods,
normal backwardation, as measured both by the frequency of positive returns and by
their average magnitude, was not typical. In addition, we cannot detect any seasonal
pattern in the returns.
3.3 Bivariate-ARCH estimation for crude oil
In this subsection, we re-estimate mean rollovers and returns for crude oil in a
systems setting. Such a strategy is called for because simultaneity can cause single
equation estimation to be inconsistent.16 Since earlier we found that crude oil was the
only energy commodity where we concluded both rollovers and returns were subject
to an ARCH effect, we use a bivariate-ARCH approach, whereby the two means are
simultaneously estimated. The two mean equations are:
tt
tt
croll
cret
,22
,11




, (11)
while the variance-covariance equations are assumed to follow:
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(12)
This is the diagonal representation of the BEKK model (Engle and Kroner 1995). In
this parameterization, variances are determined only by past own squared residuals
and covariances are determined only by cross-products of past residuals.
The results of our estimations are reported in Table 9. Noteworthy is the fact that
rollovers continue to be significantly positive, while returns though positive, and in
fact of greater magnitude than rollovers, continue to be insignificant.
4 Interpretation
How is that we can conclude that backwardation was common enough such that
average rollovers were significantly positive while normal backwardation is rejected
by the evidence – this despite the fact that we argued above that under normal
circumstances backwardation requires normal backwardation?
                                                
is so. For crude oil in the first and combined periods, the ARCH LM-test shows that lag nine is
significant.
16 A systems approach is justified by the fact that the error terms (resulting from univariate ARCH
estimation) are highly correlated.
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The answer turns out to be quite simple. Consulting the full sample results shown in
Table 9, we see that, logically enough, on average returns (in percentage terms)
exceeded rollovers (in percentage terms). Less logically, rollovers are significantly
positive while the same cannot be said for returns. In fact it all comes down to
variance. The standard error of the coefficient estimate for returns is over three times
that of rollovers.17 Rollovers exhibit less variability because both components of a
rollover are contemporaneous, while, for returns, one component is
contemporaneous and the other one lagged. Price shocks will have less of an impact
on rollovers because both elements of the difference can adjust.
There are a couple of implications to this insight. First, standard tests of futures
pricing models typically rely on the calculation of mean returns and their
significance (e.g., Kolb 1992). Our evidence suggests that such approaches may
have low power. Perhaps they should be supplemented by investigating evidence on
mean rollovers. Second, since we have now demonstrated that positive rollovers
were no sample-specific artifact only present in the first part of the sample, on this
basis it now appears that MGRM’s strategy is somewhat more defensible.
Nevertheless it must still be acknowledged that this is not because they were
pursuing a variance-minimization approach, but rather because they were
endeavoring to capitalize on a tendency for energy futures markets to display
backwardation. Moreover it remains clear that the company was overhedging, and
was thus exposing itself to the risk of adverse shifts in the term structure.
5 Conclusion
Since the inception of energy futures markets, prices have on average exhibited
backwardation. This finding is robust to considerations of seasonality and volatility
clustering. Normal backwardation has also been the norm, but, because of the low
power of the standard tests, most researchers have concluded that the unbiased
expectations model cannot be rejected. The fact that backwardation has been and
(though somewhat more weakly) continues to be prevalent makes MGRM’s strategy
look somewhat better than previous observers have argued. That said, it should be
re-stressed that their strategy was a highly speculative one and its unraveling should
have come as no great surprise.
                                          
17 For returns it is 0.0078 while for rollovers it is 0.0027.
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Figure 1: Backwardation vs. normal backwardation
Anticipated price change
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Table 1: Summary of Gains/Losses from Rollovers
Panel A: Crude Oil
1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
$ % $ % $ %
Average of All
Rollovers 0.22* 0.93%* 0.21* 0.64%# 0.21* 0.79%*
Average of All
Rollover Gains 0.65 3.00% 0.71 3.00% 0.68 3.00%
Average of All
Rollover Losses -0.32 -1.69% -0.27 -1.65% -0.30 -1.67%
Frequency of
Rollover Gains 56% 49% 52%
Panel B: Heating Oil
1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
$ % $ % $ %
Average of All
Rollovers 0.43* 1.59%* 0.29* 0.84%# 0.36* 1.24%*
Average of All
Rollover Gains 1.28 4.92% 1.12 4.02% 1.21 4.53%
Average of All
Rollover Losses -0.32 -1.30% -0.25 -2.40% -0.28 -1.27%
Frequency of
Rollover Gains 46% 40% 43%
Panel C: Gasoline
1985 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1985 – 2000
$ % $ % $ %
Average of All
Rollovers 0.50* 1.83%* 0.35* 0.90%* 0.43* 1.36%*
Average of All
Rollover Gains 0.98 3.74% 1.04 3.55% 1.01 3.66%
Average of All
Rollover Losses -0.47 -2.00% -0.45 -2.20% -0.46 -2.12%
Frequency of
Rollover Gains 67% 53% 60%
Notes: 1) * and # denote significance at the 5% and 10% (two-tailed) levels respectively.
2) All dollar rollover gains and losses are reported in $/barrel. Since heating oil and
gasoline futures are traded on a $/gallon basis, their dollar rollover gains and losses are
multiplied by 42.
3) Data for gasoline futures begin in January 1985.
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Table 2: Frequency of Rollover Gains
1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
Month Crude
 Oil
Heatin
g
 Oil
Gas Crude
Oil
Heatin
g
 Oil
Gas Crude
Oil
Heatin
g
Oil
Gas
Jan 44% 78%* 38% 63% 50% 38% 53% 65%** 38%
Feb 78% 78%** 25% 50% 50% 0%** 65%* 65%** 13%**
Mar 56% 100%*
*
38% 63% 63% 63% 59% 82%** 50%
Apr 67% 89%** 75% 75% 50% 50% 71% 71%** 63%
May 56% 78%** 88%** 25% 50% 50% 41% 65% 69%**
Jun 44% 22%** 88%** 50% 38% 25% 47% 29% 56%**
Jul 44% 11%** 75%* 38% 38% 75% 41% 24%* 75%**
Aug 44% 0%** 100%*
*
25% 13%** 88%** 35% 6%** 94%**
Sep 56% 0%** 88%* 63% 13%** 75% 59%** 6%** 81%**
Oct 44% 11%** 75%** 38% 13%** 63% 41% 12%** 69%**
Nov 78% 33% 63% 50% 38% 75% 65% 35% 69%*
Dec 56% 56% 50% 50% 63% 38% 53%* 59% 44%
Notes: 1) * denotes the case where percentage rollover gains/losses are significantly different
from zero at the 5% (two-tailed) level.
2) ** denotes the case where both dollar and percentage rollover gains/losses are
significantly different from zero at the 5% (two-tailed) level.
Table 3: Tests of Seasonality and ARCH in Rollovers
Panel A: p-values from Chi-Squared Tests of the Null Hypothesis of No Seasonality in Rollover
Gains
Period Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline
From 1984 to 1992 0.8604 0.0001 0.0082
From 1993 to 2000 0.8803 0.0055 0.0007
From 1984 to 2000 0.6057 0.0001 0.0001
Panel B: p-values from LM tests of the Null Hypothesis of No ARCH (1) Effect in the Rollover
Regression Residuals
Period Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline
From 1984 to 1992 0.0903 0.7253 0.0279
From 1993 to 2000 0.0171 0.7283 0.5443
From 1985 to 2000 0.0041 0.6452 0.1067
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Table 4: Mean Rollover Estimation Using ARCH(1) and Seasonality
Commodity: Period
Effects included in the
Adjustments
Mean Rollover Gains/Losses
(%)
Crude Oil: From 1993 to 2000 No Seasonality/ ARCH (1) 0.75%*
Crude Oil: From 1984 to 2000 No Seasonality/ ARCH (1) 0.56%*
Gasoline: From 1985 to 1992 Seasonality/ ARCH (1) 1.65%*
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% (two-tailed) level.
Table 5: Summary of Futures Returns
Panel A: Crude Oil
1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
$ % $ % $ %
Average of All
Returns 0.14 0.60% 0.30 1.00% 0.21 0.79%
Average of All
Pos. Returns 1.52 7.35% 1.63 7.67% 1.57 7.50%
Average of All
Neg. Returns -1.58 -7.83% -1.41 -7.58% -1.50 -7.71%
Frequency of
Positive
Returns
56% 56% 56%
Panel B: Heating Oil
1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
$ % $ % $ %
Average of All
Returns 0.33 1.25% 0.43# 1.30% 0.38# 1.27%#
Average of All
Pos. Returns 2.23 8.55% 2.13 8.43% 2.18 8.49%
Average of All
Neg. Returns -1.72 -6.62% -1.49 -6.78% 1.61 6.69%
Frequency of
Positive
Returns
52% 53% 52%
17
Panel C: Gasoline
1985 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1985 – 2000
$ % $ % $ %
Average of All
Returns 0.44 1.60% 0.46# 1.28% 0.45* 1.44%
Average of All
Pos. Returns 2.21 8.86% 2.11 7.90% 2.16 8.38%
Average of All
Neg. Returns -1.64 -6.98% -1.58 -6.88% 1.61 6.93%
Frequency of
Positive
Returns
54% 55% 55%
Notes: 1) * and # denote significance at the 5% and 10% (two-tailed) levels respectively.
2) All dollar returns are reported in $/barrel. Since heating oil and gasoline futures are
traded on a $/gallon basis, their dollar returns are multiplied by 42.
3) Data for gasoline futures begin in January 1985.
Table 6: Frequency of Positive Returns
1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
Month Crude
 Oil
Heating
 Oil
Gas Crude
Oil
Heating
 Oil
Gas Crude
Oil
Heating
Oil
Gas
Jan 56% 44% 63% 50% 25% 63% 53% 35% 63%
Feb 44% 33% 38% 63% 50% 50% 53% 41% 44%
Mar 67% 89%** 75% 50% 63% 75% 59% 76%** 75%**
Apr 89% 67% 75% 75% 75% 75% 82%*
*
71%** 75%
May 44% 56% 63% 50% 38% 38% 47% 47% 50%
Jun 44% 22% 50% 50% 50% 38% 47% 35% 44%
Jul 56% 67% 38% 63% 63% 50% 59% 65% 44%
Aug 56% 67% 63% 75% 63%** 63% 65% 65%** 63%
Sep 56% 67% 63% 75%* 75%** 63% 65% 71% 63%
Oct 78% 44% 63% 50% 25%** 38% 65% 35% 50%
Nov 44% 33% 13% 38% 50% 50% 41% 41% 31%
Dec 33% 33% 50% 38% 63% 63% 35% 47% 56%
Notes: 1) * denotes the case where percentage returns are significantly different from zero
at the 5% (two-tailed) level.
2) ** denotes the case where both dollar and percentage returns are significantly
different from zero at the 5% (two-tailed) level.
18
Table 7: Tests of Seasonality and ARCH in Returns
Panel A: p-values from Chi-Squared Tests of the Null Hypothesis of No Seasonality in Returns
Period Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline
From 1984 to 1992 0.6149 0.3045 0.1935
From 1993 to 2000 0.4499 0.4780 0.9521
From 1984 to 2000 0.1689 0.0694 0.1127
Panel B: p-values from LM tests of the Null Hypothesis of No ARCH(1) Effect in the Return
Regression Residuals
Period Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline
From 1984 to 1992 0.0064 0.0268 0.0574
From 1993 to 2000 0.9779 0.7362 0.4472
From 1984 to 2000 0.0010 0.0271 0.0881
Table 8: Mean Return Estimation Using ARCH(1)
Commodity: Period Mean Returns (%)
Crude Oil: From 1984 to 1992 1.49%#
Crude Oil: From 1984 to 2000 1.04%#
Heating Oil: From 1984 to 1992 1.21%
Heating Oil: From 1984 to 2000 1.40%#
Note: # denotes significance at the 10% (two-tailed) level.
Table 9: Estimations of Mean Rollovers and Returns of Crude Oil Under Bivariate-ARCH
Coefficient 1984 – 1992 1993 – 2000 1984 – 2000
Mean Return 1.47%# 1.39% 1.12%
Mean Rollover 1.04* 0.64%# 0.65%*
1 0.0061* 0.0083* 0.0077*
2 0.0012* 0.0007* 0.0009*
3 0.0016* 0.0014* 0.0013*
1 0.6709* 0.0246 0.2465*
3 0.0008 0.3707* 0.2183*
3 -0.0234 0.0956 0.2319*
Note: * and # denote significance at the 5% and 10% (two-tailed) levels respectively.
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